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Abstract. Cosmology might turn out to be the study of fluctuations around a “de Sitter equilibrium”
state. In this article I review the basic ideas and the attractive features of this framework, and
respond to a number common questions raised about the de Sitter equilibrium picture. I show that
this framework does not suffer from the “Boltzmann Brain” problem, and relate this cosmological
picture to recent work on the “clock ambiguity”.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Most approaches to theoretical cosmology ultimately require a framework which can
quantify the relative probabilities of different cosmological scenarios. For example,
the widely held belief that cosmic inflation gives an account of the initial state of the
big bang which is better or “more natural” than models without inflation can only be
substantiated within such a framework. One could hope that such a framework would
allow the various features of inflation that seem intuitively appealing to directly enhance
the probability assigned to cosmologies with inflation in a quantifiable way.
A great many models of cosmic inflation yield a picture called “eternal inflation”
[1] where inflation continues forever in (exponentially) increasingly large regions, pe-
riodically reheating in isolated regions known as “pocket universes” which can look
something like the big bang cosmology we observe (for some reviews and a sample of
recent work see [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]). It has long been hoped that the eternal
nature of eternal inflation would allow the predictions to be independent of any initial
conditions at the start of inflation, and thus yield stable results that could be regarded as
the robust predictions of the inflationary cosmology.
So far things have not turned out this way. Eternal inflation typically leads to a variety
of types of pocket universes, each produced in infinite quantities. To predict which type
of pocket universes are most likely one must regulate these infinities in some way. To
date, there is no physically determined (or even universally agreed upon) way to regu-
late the infinities, and discussions of this matter usually invert the question to: “Which of
1 To appear in the proceedings of the DICE2008 conference, Thomas Elze ed..
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the various possible regularization schemes yield predictions that actually match what
we observe?” (Many do not.) Posing the question this way may be realistic and even
interesting in the absence of something better. But as long as one is framing the problem
in these terms one is, at least for the time being, abandoning the prospect of actually
making concrete predictions from inflation. If one embraces the string theory landscape
picture the problem is only made greater by an unspecified multitude of possible infla-
tons experiencing eternal inflation. One might hope that a better understanding of the
underlying physics would eventually regulate the infinities for us and lead to robust pre-
dictions (perhaps holographic considerations[13, 14, 15, 12] and/or other approaches to
carefully developing the formalism[16, 17, 18, 19, 20] will ultimately help with this).
Another possibility is that the current predicament is a reflection of serious problems
with the whole framework of eternal inflation which will prevent it from ever gaining
predictive power.
This paper is about an alternative framework for assigning probabilities in cosmology
which I currently find more promsing than eternal inflation. This framework, which
I call the “de Sitter Equilibrium” (dSE) cosmology has been examined in two previous
papers[21, 22]. In this article I briefly review the dSE picture and call out the key reasons
I find this framework attractive. I then comment on some of the questions that have come
up regarding dSE since the earlier work appeared. I also offer a quantitative estimate that
illustrates how the dSE picture can evade the so-called “Boltzmann Brain” problem. I
then discuss how the dSE framework might relate to my recent work on the “clock
ambiguity” which at least superficially might appear to be taking things in an orthogonal
direction.
2. THE DSE FRAMEWORK
2.1. General Features
Intuitively, one can think of equilibrium for a system as the state a system achieves
if left without external intervention for an arbitrarily long time. By this standard, de
Sitter space can be thought of as the equilibrium state achieved by any system which
obeys Einstein gravity with a positive cosmological constant Λ. This point requires the
cosmological constant to be truly constant, not the energy of a false vacuum that would
ultimately decay through tunneling processes[23] or other instabilities[24, 25].
If our universe does have a true (perfectly stable) positive cosmological constant the
correct long-term description of the universe would be a state closely approximating
de Sitter space. The Hawking temperature of de Sitter space would create fluctuations
which could (very rarely) be sufficiently large to cause a temporary deviation into a state
that does not look at all like a classical de Sitter space.
Under these conditions the field of theoretical cosmology become the study of the
full range of fluctuations out of a de Sitter background, and the interpretation of these
different fluctuations as possible cosmological scenarios. One very attractive feature
of this picture is that probabilities are assigned to fluctuations in an equilibrium state
without any reference to “initial conditions”, a concept which is meaningless in a system
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eternally in equilibrium. For fluctuations in an equilibrium state, it is just the laws
of physics (the Hamiltonian) that determine the probabilities of various fluctuations.
Another attractive feature of the dSE picture is that the presence of a horizon surrounding
any observer in de Sitter space leads to quantitative treatments that appears much more
naturally finite, in contrast to the infinities which seem to fundamentally plague eternal
inflation.
Of course, the main prediction of the dSE picture might be taken to be that the
universe should be observed in a pure de Sitter equilibrium state. The viability of
dSE as a framework for theoretical cosmology depends crucially on one’s willingness
to impose the thermodynamic arrow of time as a condition, rather than something
that must predicted as a universal and eternal feature of one’s theory. Many authors
(although not all [26, 27]) have indeed found it reasonable to use the arrow of time
as a condition[28, 29, 30, 31]. This could come about through some sort of anthropic
argument related to how critical the arrow of time is for the functioning of observers
like us, or it could be a much more narrowly formulated choice to use the fact that we
observe an arrow of time as a condition to pose conditional probability questions about
the universe.
2.2. de Sitter Entropy
An observer in a de Sitter space with positive cosmological constant Λ is surrounded
by an event horizon of radius RΛ given by
R−2Λ =
ρΛ
3m2P
=
Λ
3 . (1)
Throughout we use h¯ = c = kB = 1 and m2P ≡ l2P ≡ 1/8piG. As with the black hole case,
the horizon is associated with an entropy
SΛ = pi
R2Λ
l2P
(2)
Gibbons and Hawking (who were the first to propose and study de Sitter entropy[32])
showed that when other objects (in particular black holes) are put in a de Sitter space
the overall entropy goes down. Specifically, when a black hole with entropy SBH is place
inside a de Sitter space with entropy SΛ the horizon of the de Sitter space shrinks so that
the entropy of the combined system is
SΛ → SΛ−
√
SΛSBH +SBH ≈ SΛ−
√
SΛSBH. (3)
Even though the black hole entropy has added to the total, the decrease due to horizon
shrinkage (2nd term) is greater than the increase due to the additional entropy of the
black hole (for black holes small enough to fit in the de Sitter horizon in the first place),
leading to a net entropy decrease. Any localized matter will look like a black hole
sufficiently far away and will decrease the horizon entropy accordingly while adding less
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entropy than would be the case for the true black hole. Similar arguments can be made
about adding a more uniform radiation field to de Sitter space, and thus the statement
that the de Sitter entropy is the maximum possible entropy for a system with a stable
cosmological constant appears to be quite robust. This maximal entropy feature is one
of the reasons de Sitter space appears fit to be regarded as an equilibrium state.
2.3. Recurrences
Both previous papers on dSE cosmology have made use of the following picture: The
de Sitter space is regarded as a finite system in a Hilbert space of dimension
NΛ ≡ eSΛ . (4)
One can then make the ergodic argument that a particular fluctuation which is consistent
with NF microstates occurs with probability
PF =
NF
NΛ
≡ tF
tR
. (5)
The finite system is expected to experience recurrences on a time tR ∝ NΛ and the system
spends a time tF ∝ NF in the fluctuation, which is the origin of the last equality in Eqn.
5. Furthermore, one can infer NF from the minimum entropy SF exhibited by the entire
system during the fluctuation, and thus write
PF =
NF
NΛ
≡ e
SF
eSΛ
. (6)
If the fluctuation is a small localized mass concentration in the de Sitter background,
then (using Eqn. 3)
PF = exp
{
−
√
SΛSBH
}
(7)
where SBH is the entropy of the black hole with equivalent ADM mass to the localized
fluctuation.
2.4. Probabilities for fluctuation into our observed Universe
The formalism being outlined here should in principle serve as a means to calculate
the probability of any fluctuation out of the de Sitter equilibrium. Of particular interest
are the probabilities for a fluctuation into an inflating state, a fluctuation into a standard
big bang cosmology without inflation, and a fluctuation into a “Boltzmann Brain”[22]. If
the probability for a fluctuation to enter cosmic inflation is much higher than the others,
the formalism supports the prevailing beliefs in theoretical cosmology. Otherwise, the
formalism is in conflict with these beliefs. In what follows, we will simply assume that
the physical degrees of freedom include an inflaton and other fields suitably chosen and
coupled to allow the standard cosmological picture: inflation → reheating → standard
big bang (SBB) to be a possible behavior of the system.
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2.4.1. Probabilities for the Farhi Guth Guven process
In [22] Sorbo and I (AS) studied the formation of an inflating universe form dSE
via the following process: A small seed fluctuation of localized matter forms with
probability Pc which then has probability Pq of fluctuating further into an inflating state.
We used Eqns. 3 and 7 to calculate
Pc = exp
{
−
√
SΛSS
}
(8)
where SS is the entropy of the black hole with the same ADM mass as the fluctuation.
The (necessarily quantum) probability that the local fluctuation excites the inflaton field
and tunnels into an inflating state is given by
Pq = exp
{
−pi
(
RI
lP
)2}
≈ exp{−SI} (9)
where RI is the de Sitter radius during inflation
R−2I ≡
ρI
3m2P
(10)
and ρI is the energy density during inflation. This two-stage process is known as the
Farhi Guth Guven process [33, 34]. Combining Eqns. 8 and 9 gives a probability
PI ≡ PcPq = exp
{
−
√
SΛSS−SI
}
(11)
for entering into an inflating state.
One should compare this with the probability of fluctuating into the standard big bang
without inflation. One can think of the formation of the SBB without inflation as the
time reverse of the process of “heat death” of the SBB into de Sitter space. Seen that
way the probability of fluctuating straight into the SBB is given by equating the entropy
of the fluctuation (SF in Eqn. 6) to the entropy of the observed universe SSBB ≈ 10100
(or perhaps one should use SSBB ≈ 1085, the entropy the observed universe had in the
radiation era). Either way, the probability for fluctuating into the SBB without inflation
(from Eqn. 6) is exponentially lower than getting there via inflation (Eqn. 11)2
PI
PSBB
= exp
{
SΛ−
√
SΛSSBB
}
≫ 1 (12)
As discussed at length in [22], this calculation appears to validate the standard picture
of modern cosmology, where inflation is highly favored over other scenarios.
2 This calculation of PSBB follows the calculation of this quantity in [21]. In [22] we considered a different
expression which has a less straightforward motivation (and one which I find less compelling at the time
I write this) One could use either expression for PSBB in what follows without changing any of the key
points.
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2.4.2. DKS probabilities
In [21] Dyson Kleban and Susskind (DKS) argued that a universe undergoing inflation
looks a lot like a de Sitter space, but with ρΛ = ρI, the energy density of the inflaton field
during inflation. In parallel with Eqn. 2 one can define
SI = pi
R2I
l2P
≡ pi
l2P
3m2p
ρI
(13)
and based on holographic considerations DKS argued that Eqn. 13 should give the
entropy of the entire universe during inflation. When seen in that light, the probability
for a fluctuation leading to inflation is given by
PI = exp{−(SΛ−SI)} (14)
giving
PI
PSBB
= exp{−(SSBB−SI)}≪ 1 (15)
Since inflation is disfavored in this picture it runs totally against the modern picture
of cosmology. Furthermore DKS argued that, even ignoring inflation there are lots of
cosmologies that would be exponentially favored over the observed one (for example,
cosmologies with a slightly higher cosmic microwave background temperature and thus
a larger value S′SBB > SSBB).
3. ISSUES AND DISCUSSION
In the this and subsequent sections I will comment on some issues that have been raised
in various informal conversations that have taken place since the publication of [22].
Many are related to the differences between the AS and DKS calculations outlined in
section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, so that is a good place to start.
3.1. dSE as a heat bath
In the AS approach the de Sitter space is seen as a large system for which the
fluctuation involves only a small fraction of the entropy. When the seed forms and
fluctuates into an inflating universe, the full physical system describes both the de
Sitter space (with the fluctuation present, which just looks like a small black hole to
an observer elsewhere in the de Sitter space) and separately the inflating state, destined
to reheat and form the SBB.
This picture depends critically on the belief (not universally shared[35]) that standard
features of quantum mechanics should extend to quantum gravity so as to allow a wave-
function that describes one semiclassical spacetime to fluctuate into one that describes
more than one semiclassical spacetime represented by different physical degrees of free-
dom. Thus one would expect the wavefunction following the FGG process to be given by
de Sitter equilibrium as a fundamental framework for cosmology November 18, 2018 6
a combination of two wavefunctions, one describing the perturbed background de Sitter
space (expressed in one subspace) and one describing the inflating state (expressed in
another subspace). As the inflating state reheats, goes through the SBB phase and even-
tually achieves “heat death” in the final approach to the background de Sitter space, the
two parts of the wavefunctions would represent the same physical state and the system
would again describe only one semiclassical spacetime, the equilibrium de Sitter space.
To track the entropy of this process, one must evaluate the entropy of the entire
system (including both semiclassical spacetimes). From that perspective, the fact that
the actual fluctuation that starts inflating has a small entropy makes such a fluctuation
more likely, because it removes less entropy from the background de Sitter space than
a larger fluctuation would. In other words, the entropy of the entire system makes a
smaller drop to start inflation than it would to fluctuate directly into the SBB cosmology,
and that makes inflation more likely.
By contrast, the DKS calculation assigns an entropy SI to the entire universe once in-
flation starts. In that approach, the smaller SI, the greater the entropic cost of fluctuating
into an inflating state, and generally the cost is much greater to fluctuate into inflation
rather than directly into the SBB.
At this point whether one chooses the FGG analysis or DKS depends on what one
believes about the way a fundamental theory of quantum gravity should work (whether,
for example, the holographic interpretation of inflation used by DKS is appropriate). In
this paper I focus on the FGG process, which results in a cosmological picture which I
find quite attractive.
Interestingly, the holographic analysis that leads to Eqn. 14 in the DKS approach
can be duplicated by the Coleman De Luccia[23] (CDL) tunneling process. The CDL
process leads to the same quantitative tunneling probability for entering an inflating
state from the background or “fundamental” de Sitter space. However, if both the CDL
and FGG processes are allowed, FGG will win because it is much faster[36]. Some
have expressed skepticism that the FGG process is physically allowed. If FGG could
be eliminated, then the tunneling analysis will be dominated by CDL and thus give the
same result as the DKS analysis.
3.1.1. Issues with the FGG process
Here are a few issues some have with the FGG process, along with my thoughts in
response:
Ill-defined path integral: The path integral methods used by FGG have some curious
properties, including a Euclidean interpolating solution that is not a manifold. This has
led to some skepticism that perhaps the FGG process is not valid. However, Fischler
Morgan and Polchinski (FMP) [37, 38] used a Hamiltonian approach to calculate the
same process which does not have any similar technical peculiarities, and the results
were the same (this is why the FMP approach was used in [22]).
The m→ 0 limit: In the limit where the mass of the seed fluctuation that initiates the
FGG process is taken to zero, the process still proceeds at a finite rate. Some cite this as
a problematic feature that suggests the FGG process in unphysical. Personally, I would
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expect the m → 0 behavior is an artifact of the thin wall approximation (used by both
FGG and and FMP) which is likely to break down at some finite value of the seed mass
(I consider a lower bound on the seed mass based on such considerations in section 4
below).
AdS/CFT calculations: Freivogel et al. [39] analyzed something like the FGG process
using AdS/CFT techniques. They showed that the FGG process they considered violates
unitarity and thus they argued the FGG process is not physically allowed. However,
AdS/CFT analysis is not able to describe processes that allow the boundary of the bulk
to fluctuate. While some believe this is a reflection of the fundamental nature of quantum
gravity, another interpretation is that this means that an AdS/CFT analysis cannot give a
full account of quantum gravity. If one takes that view, then the results in [39] might a
reflection of the limitations of the AdS/CFT analysis.
4. DSE AND BOLTZMANN BRAINS
I now turn to the question of “Boltzmann Brains” in dSE cosmology. The “Boltzmann
Brain problem” (first posed in [40] and recently receiving renewed attention[22, 41,
35, 9, 42]) refers to the situation where one’s cosmological framework assigns a higher
probability to isolated “observers” fluctuating briefly out of equilibrium versus observers
which are correlated with large cosmological (non-equilibrium) states of matter the way
we are. Boltzmann Brain observers may have (false) memories of planet Earth, the solar
system, galaxies, cosmic microwave background maps etc., but their destiny is to be
immediately reabsorbed in the background equilibrium state. Since this is not what we
experience, cosmological frameworks which strongly favor Boltzmann Brain observers
are typically considered to be failures.
In dSE, the probability assigned to a single Boltzmann Brain observer (BB) is given
by using
SBH = SSBr ≡
(
mBr
mP
)2
(16)
in Eqn. 7, where SSBr is the entropy of a black hole with the same ADM mass, mBr as the
BB, giving
PBr = exp
{
−
√
SΛSBr
}
(17)
To compare this with Eqn. 11 for the probability for inflation one must consider the
value of SS, the entropy of a black hole with ADM mass equal to the seed mass mS for
the FGG process. While the mS → 0 gives the dominant process, as discussed above and
in [22], the thin wall approximation should break down as one takes this limit. Here we
assume the scale of the inflaton potential gives a lower bound on mS given by
mS = ρIR3I = 0.0013kg
((
1016GeV
)4
ρI
)1/2
. (18)
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Keeping only the dominant terms gives
PBr
PI
=
exp
{−√SΛSBr}
exp
{−√SΛSS} . (19)
Inflation is favored when SS < SBr which gives
(
mBr
0.0013kg
)
>
((
1016GeV
)4
ρI
)1/2
(20)
which is a condition that is very easily met. Thus the dSE framework (using the FGG
process) does not appear to suffer from the BB problem.
5. DSE, ENTROPY AND TIME SYMMETRY
5.1. The low entropy of inflation-produced SBB’s
From a sufficiently fine-grained point of view, an SBB cosmology that started with
reheating at the end of an inflationary era will always have much lower entropy than
other SBB cosmologies that don’t have that special starting point. This can be illustrated
by the fact that the time-reverse of an SBB cosmology is highly unlikely to suck all
the energy of the universe into the coherent (and extremely low entropy form) of a
homogeneous rolling scalar field.
Although this feature is sometimes cited as a problem for inflation [43, 44, 45], in the
context of dSE cosmology things are just as they should be. It is a remarkable property
of inflation that it can take a low entropy (inflating) state and reheat it into an state that
appears sufficiently high in entropy (from a suitably coarse-grained point of view) to
look like an SBB cosmology. But the fact that the inflationary path to the SBB actually
has much lower fine grained entropy than the “typical” SBB allows it to leave more
entropy in the “heat bath”, making it a much more likely fluctuation out of dSE.
5.2. What about the time reversed process?
As discussed already in section 3.1, the late time evolution of our observed universe
will eventually re-equilibrate with the eternal de Sitter space. Also, since there is only
some small probability of tunneling into inflation in the first place, there will be different
parts of the wavefunction representing the part that tunneled into inflation and the part
that did not. These different parts will “re-cohere” as they all approach (or remain in)
the dSE state.
It seems reasonable to expect that this late-time re-equilibration would look very
much the same whether it was an inflation-produced SBB or a “regular” SBB doing the
equilibration. Furthermore, with nothing defining a universal time direction for the dSE
state, one could equally well expect the “tunneling out” and “equilibrating back” events
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to happen in either order (a meta-observer with a universal time arrow would equally
often see the time reversed process, but of course a resident of the corresponding SBB
phase would just see time in the direction of increasing entropy).
The dSE framework implies that the process of an SBB “decohering out” of the dSE
(the time reverse of re-equilibration) should be much more likely if the SBB state in
question is destined (due to extremely subtle microscopic features) to eventually back
into an inflating state, than if it were a “regular” SBB with no period of inflation at the
“beginning”. But it seems extremely hard to imagine how that could be the case, since
it seems natural for the re-coherence process to look the same in terms of features that
matter to the dynamical properties at that stage (i.e. localized mass concentrations that
could change the de Sitter horizon).
My response to this point is that indeed it is hard to see how the probabilities would
work out to be so different for the two cases, but we should be used to that sort of thing
being hard. A box of gas has a much lower probability of fluctuating in and out of a gold
watch state than it does fluctuating in and out of a pile of dirt state. But one would expect
the final stages of re-cohering to the equilibrium state (at both ends of the fluctuation)
would look very much the same for the cases of the gold watch and the dirt. It is probably
very hard to tell at that stage of the evolution what makes one fluctuation much more
probable than the other. So I believe if one can tolerate that being a difficult problem for
the box of gas, one should be able to tolerate the equivalent problem for the dSE picture
being at least as hard.
One can also ask whether there is something fundamentally wrong with the FGG
process since it looks so time-asymmetrical (tunneling at one end and equilibration at
the other). What place is there for such an asymmetric process in system with so much
time symmetry? Even the “watch” and “dirt” fluctuations discussed directly above would
be expected to be fully time-symmetric.
To further consider this question I propose the following analogy: Consider a box of
gas divided in two by a barrier that can only be penetrated by quantum tunneling, as
depicted in Fig. 1. The gas on both sides of the barrier is in equilibrium, with the same
equilibrium properties on both sides.
Figure 2 depicts a zoomed-in view of a gas particle tunneling through the barrier. The
wavefunction of the incoming particle divides into two pieces, a coherent sum of a piece
that tunnels through and a piece that bounces back. The time reverse of this process
seems very odd: A particle coherently matched on both sides of the barrier in order to
pull onto just one side after striking the barrier. But the box of gas is perfectly time-
symmetrical and the tunneling process occurring in both directions is equally likely. I
suspect our preference for viewing this tunneling event in a particular time direction is a
reflection of our own experience living in a very time-asymmetric world, and I believe a
similar assessment applies to concerns about the apparent time-asymmetry of the FGG
process in the dSE picture.
6. DSE AND THE CLOCK AMBIGUITY
The dSE cosmological framework appears to be built on laws of physics that are truly
eternal and stable. One has the picture of a universe evolving though infinitely many
de Sitter equilibrium as a fundamental framework for cosmology November 18, 2018 10
EQM EQM
FIGURE 1. A box of gas with a barrier that can only be penetrated by quantum tunneling. The gas on
both sides is in an equilibrium state with the same properties.
FIGURE 2. A zoomed-in cartoon of a tunneling event at the barrier depicted in Fig. 1. We find it
convenient to think of the tunneling in this highly time-asymmetric way, even though the system as a
whole is time-symmetric.
recurrence times and building up statistics for even the rarest of fluctuations. Apparently
all this would require perfectly stable physical laws.
In another line of investigation, Iglesias and I[46, 47, 48] have studied a picture
motivated by the “clock ambiguity” in which the laws of physics are emergent and are
only stable for a finite period of time. Using arguments developed in [48] (especially
Eqn. 8 in that paper) one can find lower bounds on NH , the number of states in the
Hilbert space describing our physical world. One gets values for the lower bound around
exp
{
1060
}
or even exp
{
10100
}
, but typically not higher. It the context of that work it
makes sense to regard the lower bound as the typical or possibly even the predicted
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value of NH . From that point of view, NH from the clock ambiguity work would be
exponentially smaller than the value NH ≥ exp{SΛ} ≈ exp
{
10120
}
required to have
stable physical laws even for one recurrence time.
Thus it would seem that these two ways of thinking about the cosmos and physical
laws (the clock ambiguity work and the dSE cosmology) are deeply at odds with one
another. That in itself is not necessarily a problem, since all these ideas lie in such a
speculative domain that this is probably not the right time to expect them to fit together.
But still, I find it interesting to reflect a bit further on the possible connections between
these ways of thinking.
In the dSE cosmology, the universe spends by far most of the time simply sitting in
equilibrium, subject to tiny fluctuations that are completely uninteresting for cosmology.
How much stability is required of the laws of physics in order to sustain this this equi-
librium picture? Perhaps not a lot3. Perhaps these two pictures can coexist as long as the
laws of physics can be stable over cosmologically interesting timescales, a requirement
that we showed in [48] is quite easy to meet.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Viewing cosmology as the study of fluctuations around a de Sitter equilibrium state has a
number of appealing features. It seems more naturally finite than the picture that emerges
from “chaotic inflation” (for which the regulation of infinities is a problem), and does
not depend on what one assumes for “initial conditions” (it does not have any). When
viewed from the point of view of the FGG process (as in [22]), this framework shows
that inflation is favored over big bang cosmologies without inflation because inflation
presents an entropically “cheaper” way to form cosmological fluctuations. In this paper
I have also quantified the claim (first made in [29]) that one of the important roles of
inflation can be to evade the “Boltzmann Brain” problem. I’ve also sought to address
various questions that have been raised about this picture, in the hopes of moving those
discussions forward.
There are many open questions: Which (if either) interpretation of the dSE cosmology
(DKS[21] or AS[22]) is correct? (They give totally different answers.) How can one
make the treatment more rigorous? (A new formalism for correlation functions in de
Sitter space[50] or other explorations[51] may hold some clues.) How can the predictive
power be more fully developed? I find these questions interesting in their own right,
but especially so given the many attractive features of de Sitter equilibrium cosmology.
Progress on these open questions will help us see if these ideas can ultimately make
good on their promise to provide deep theoretical foundations for cosmology.
3 This is related to, but not quite the same as a point made in [49] about the stability of quantum
measurements over a recurrence time
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